‘We’re not interested in exhibition golf’
THE PGA TOUR HAS TAKEN THE HARDEST OF HARD-LINE stances against LIV Golf. The message from Ponte Vedra headquarters has been clear since rumors of the “Saudi Golf League”—the name that Monahan and the tour insist on using—began percolating in early 2020, and it underlined the unwillingness to listen to LIV’s initial proposal. The tour’s stance, to put it simply, was: This is not good for golf, and you’re either with us or you’re with them.
PGA Tour Commissioner Jay Monahan has thus far taken a hard-line stance against LIV Golf, including the ban of players who have moved to the Saudi Arabia-backed circuit. Richard Heathcote
The PGA Tour wasted little time this year drawing its line in the sand by informing its membership on May 10 that no releases would be granted for the first LIV event in London, and that players who participated anyway would be in violation of the PGA Tour handbook and subject to discipline. Once the first tee shots were hit at Centurion Golf Club at the same time on June 8—shotgun start and all—the PGA Tour announced immediate suspensions for all its members in the LIV field. This stance was immediately and very publicly lambasted by Norman, who called the move “anti-golfer, anti-fan and anti-competitive.” Norman and his associates have lobbed insults and taunts at the PGA Tour throughout the past couple months; the PGA Tour has been more careful in its communications and word choice, but Monahan has not wavered in his opposition to LIV’s existence.”We want to be additive to the ecosystem,” LIV’s Khosla says. “We are very willing and want to continue to work with all the tours.”
Despite the combativeness, LIV officials insist they’d love a meeting with PGA Tour executives.
“That has been our desire from the get-go,” Khosla says. “We want to be, and we believe we are, additive to the ecosystem. We are very willing and want to continue to work with all the tours. … I would love to [talk to the PGA Tour]. I would absolutely love to. And even if it’s just to build the relationship, I very much welcome the opportunity to do that.”
Some PGA Tour players want peace accords to take place. At the Open Championship, Jon Rahm responded to a question about the future of the Ryder Cup by expressing a desire for the bickering parties to come to the negotiation table. There was also Rory McIlroy, the de facto spokesman for the PGA Tour throughout this schism, saying at the J.P. McManus Pro-Am in July that he believed it was time for both sides to talk.
“If these people are serious about investing billions of dollars into golf, I think ultimately that’s a good thing,” McIlroy said. “But it has to be done the right way and I think if they were to invest, having it be invested inside the existing structures.”
Tour executives, however, seem to have no interest in such discussions or any parceling of the calendar. The PGA Tour declined to speak with Golf Digest for this story, but a spokesman did convey their ultimate position: “What exactly would we be discussing? The tour isn’t for sale, and we’re not interested in exhibition golf.”
Rory McIlroy has been among the most vocal supporters of the PGA Tour and has said it’s worth listening to LIV Golf if it’s interested in investing in a proven commodity. Stuart Franklin/R&A
Which, of course, makes sense. The PGA Tour’s rigid stance is no doubt a strategic play, but one drawback of that approach is that it makes later cooperation that much less feasible. Instead, Monahan has vowed both privately and publicly to focus on improving his own tour. It started well before the first LIV event, when the tour devised the Player Impact Program as a way to reward its most famous players for something not directly related to their on-course performance. Despite the tour’s insistence that such a program was in the works long before, the PIP is widely seen on tour as a preemptive response to LIV—ironic, then, that five of the initial 10 winners have since left the PGA Tour for LIV Golf—though the inaugural PIP winner, Tiger Woods, reportedly turned down a $700 million to $800 million offer from LIV. And in a June press conference, Monahan outlined a number of rather significant changes to the PGA Tour’s structure, which again seemed heavily influenced by the existential challenge he faces. The general theme: more money going to the best players, a return to a calendar-year schedule and doubling down on its signature heritage events.
Starting for the 2023 FedEx Cup Playoffs, only 70 PGA Tour players—down from 125—will make it to the postseason and keep full status for the next season. The top 50 in the final FedEx Cup standings also will qualify for lucrative, no-cut “international series” events that will be held outside the U.S. in the fall. And purses for eight invitational events throughout the season are increasing to an average of $20 million per event. Rather than negotiate with LIV, the PGA Tour is banking that its proven business model, continued added investment in its own product, and the willingness to adapt—including veering away from its 72-hole format more often—will continue to make the circuit the best place to play professional golf. And that talented new prospects will fill the void left by others who might have left for LIV.
New and current stars will be paid handsomely. The PGA Tour has begun circulating a document to players that projects how much money they would’ve earned had their careers begun during the upcoming 2022-23 season based on a four percent year-over-year growth in the tour’s total comprehensive earnings. The projected figures are staggering: If Jim Furyk, who is now 52 years old, began his rookie season in 2022-23 and had the same 28-year career—including 17 wins—his total compensation from the PGA Tour would exceed $620 million. (Furyk’s current actual earnings are $71.5 million.) To sample a few others: Rory McIlroy would be at $373 million; Jordan Spieth at $240 million; Brandt Snedeker at $180 million; Ryan Palmer at $100 million; Keegan Bradley at $97 million; Jason Gore at $21 million.
But those projections do not include any guaranteed money—instead, they are calculated by applying future payment structures to past earnings.
“All of this money we’re projecting will be earned on a competitive basis,” the PGA Tour executive said, “and that’s a hallmark of the PGA Tour. Even with the PIP program, there are different components, but you’ve earned those based on how you’ve competed.”
Of course, this is a projection of a tomorrow that is under tour control. It also must reckon with a future it doesn’t fully control.
ON AUG. 3, MICKELSON, DECHAMBEAU AND NINE OTHER LIV GOLF MEMBERS filed a lawsuit against the tour, believing the suspensions they received for defecting constituted antitrust actions. It is a lawsuit the PGA Tour has expected and feels confident about being in the right. History is on the tour’s side. It has successfully defended itself against antitrust claims from Morris Communications Corporation regarding the tour’s limitations on real-time scoring, and it prevailed in former tour player Harry Toscano’s Clayton Act antitrust lawsuit against the Senior PGA Tour. It also won a class-action lawsuit brought by caddies against the tour using antitrust and intellectual property claims.
Phil Mickelson is among the LIV players who brought an antitrust lawsuit against the PGA Tour for not allowing them to play. Jonathan Ferrey/LIV Golf
This is a different battle, and the tour is also staring down an antitrust probe from the Department of Justice. It’s worth noting the Federal Trade Commision concluded after a four-year investigation in the early 1990s that the tour had violated antitrust laws—partially due to the rule stipulating permission for a conflicting-event release—and recommended federal action. But no action was ultimately taken, a circumstance credited to the work of then-PGA Tour Commissioner Tim Finchem (a lawyer himself who worked in President Jimmy Carter’s administration) and the tour’s lobbying mastery. Coincidentally, this clashed with Norman’s first try to challenge the PGA Tour through his attempt to launch the World Tour. This time, the tour is facing an entity that can match, if not usurp, its lobbying efforts. This time, the tour could lose.
The battle will be fought on multiple fronts. There are players who have not jumped but will, both after the FedEx Cup and Presidents Cup, along with those who defect after 2023 or 2024. While the first wave of LIV members mostly constituted injury-prone players, rank-and-file names, those past 40 and maligned personalities, LIV likely will sign those who are young, transcendent and marketable.
There are multiple sponsors, sources tell Golf Digest, that aren’t exactly thrilled with the tour’s handling of the LIV situation. Though the new media-rights deal accounts for most of the added money in bonuses and purses, the tour has gone to companies looking to aid its new fall series, and the reception has thus far been cold, sources say. Existing partners, upset at sponsoring tournaments with depleted fields, are not crazy about giving the tour more money. There is a fear in tour circles that if the circuit pushes too hard, these companies could eventually go to the other side.
Then there is the tour’s own media rights. Its new agreement started in 2022 and runs to 2030. Concerns that CBS, NBC or ESPN would want to renegotiate or invalidate its deal if the tour continues to lose a number of its marquee attractions are fair, although multiple sources with these stakeholders say, at this point, they are not worried about a diluted product and are in lockstep with the tour. Of greater worry for the tour are potential deals down the road. These media agreements are worked out years in advance, and sources tell Golf Digest the current deal was mostly finished by the middle of 2019. A LIV Golf circuit that is fully operational in 2025—and one that has a defined future—could wreak havoc on anything the tour hopes for in its new media framework.
The tour’s position against LIV is not just public posturing; those around the tour insist Monahan and his staff believe what he says to be true. But players, agents and others in the industry see how the tour is under siege and envision that peace—or at least a detente—will have to be struck to stave off a watered-down tour. So what would cooperation between LIV and the PGA Tour look like?
Make no mistake, there are reasons why cooperation might work for both sides. LIV Golf, which seemingly holds momentum, gets what it initially wanted: acceptance into the current framework. Saudi Arabia and Vision 2030 receive a blessing from a globally recognized institution that pushes them closer to the perception of a modernized culture. LIV Golf members get to keep the enormous sums they made and get the freedom they once had on the tour to pick their schedules. Not for nothing, it keeps the door open to play in major championships and Ryder Cup—a path that seemingly is starting to close and one that could be shut completely if LIV doesn’t receive OWGR accreditation. (As one Augusta National source relayed after the filing of the Mickelson lawsuit: “Know a good way to get curbed by ANGC? Bring ANGC into a lawsuit.”)
For the tour, things are messier. Yes, the LIV Golf financial resources would help subsidize the tour and its purses, the membership would be made whole again and a potential PGA Tour-LIV agreement would be perceived less of a merger and more of an acquisition. But there is the reality of weakening a previously strong stance and the optics that come with it. Would player suspensions—assuming the tour hasn’t lost the lawsuit—be dropped? How would it handle blowback from its existing members, who watched LIV members cash huge paydays and ultimately be allowed back while they missed out on similar opportunities out of loyalty? Even in a treaty there will be casualties.
In the days after the LIV golfers filed their suit, the tone from PGA Tour players toward their peers who jumped to LIV changed. While once respectful of the decision made to move on, there was more venom toward them as they went ahead with a legal challenge.
“Their vision is cherry-picking what events they want to play on the PGA Tour,” Billy Horschel, a former PGA Tour Policy Board member, said. “Obviously, that would be the higher World Ranking events and bigger purses. It’s frustrating. They made a decision to leave, and they should go follow their employer. I know there are guys a lot more angry and frustrated about it than me.”
Another victim in this fight could be the postseason race on the DP World Tour (formerly European Tour). While LIV Golf’s 2023 season will be spread across the calendar, multiple sources lay out a scenario in which the PGA Tour ultimately allows space for LIV Golf to operate during the fall, effectively taking the place of the yet-to-be-announced international series. LIV has already telegraphed it’s not opposed to this time frame: Five of its eight events this year occur after the FedEx Cup Playoffs have concluded. The tour would still use autumn to provide for those outside the top 50 to wrestle for following-year status, conceding its stars would play elsewhere in September, October and November. It’s a tough swallow for the tour, yet better to lose them during the football portion of the sports calendar than for the entire year. Unfortunately, the DP World Tour’s Race to Dubai takes place in November, and while it could survive the PGA Tour’s three-event international series, a LIV Golf fall itinerary likely involves a minimum of five to six events. Moving the Race to Dubai to the end of summer would coincide with the tour playoffs. The DP World Tour already faces the knock of being a feeder circuit; a potential retrofitting would compound that stigma.
Although it’s a bit more far-fetched, there’s also the chance for LIV Golf competitions to be held during the tour’s season. There are a handful of tournaments that have struggled with sponsorship for years that could be vulnerable, and the fact that the WGCs having gone from four to one raises the question if LIV could take over the Match Play. There would be matters to sort out—who qualifies for the LIV events, how TV/streaming deals would work, and would the events be co-sanctioned.
The alternative is this: A professional golf landscape that looks a lot like professional boxing—a realm with multiple organizations and almost zero unification that has turned a once-popular sport into a niche entertainment. The game’s attention could be divided between a league that has popular figures but tournaments that border on exhibition, up against a traditional power that has real competition but has lost some of its most high-profile competitors. As one major championship official opined, “The PGA Tour could become what the Euro Tour is now, and LIV Golf would be like the Pro Bowl—big names, horrible watch.”
In regards to majors, there’s the theory that the Masters, PGA Championship, U.S. Open and Open Championship could be strengthened in a divided game, the already heightened weeks gaining importance if they’re the only four occasions when the entire sport gathers. But if the majors back the PGA Tour and restrict LIV Golf members from participating, they too will lose weight.
Should the DP World Tour and PGA of America stay true to their LIV threats, the Ryder Cup could be lost. Fair or not, the onus is on the PGA Tour to keep it together. Most of LIV’s members have already shown they don’t care about consequences, at least enough to prevent them from padding their bank accounts. The tour didn’t start the schism, yet it may be the only thing standing in the way of preventing the sport from ripping in two.
THEY SEE WHAT YOU SEE. The misspellings of player names, getting their members’ nationalities wrong, the press-conference disasters. For an organization trying its best to rid itself of sportswashing accusations, LIV Golf has been unable to put its best foot forward without tripping over the other through its first three events.
But it’s worth remembering this inaugural season is a trial run of sorts, and not just for those inside the ropes. Prior to the weekend at Trump Bedminster, one LIV liaison said the summer had been “revealing.” This person put the LIV workers into two groups: the adults and the children. The children are the ones making mistake after mistake, or they took a LIV offer as an early retirement package thinking little would be involved. The adults … they see what LIV has already done and what it could be once the children are sent packing. “If everyone would stop ragging on [LIV], you could see how good it can be,” the consultant said. Eventually, this person maintained, LIV would get things right.
The event at Bedminster was eventually won by Henrik Stenson. To grab the millions at LIV, the Swede had to surrender the Ryder Cup captaincy, a role and responsibility that was once viewed as priceless. For him to win millions, Europe had to lose its Ryder Cup captain. His decision to join was a zero-sum game. You didn’t have to squint to see the symmetry.